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Rather than seek to distinguish hype from legitimate promise, it may be more
helpful to think about personalised medicine as embodying a promissory
economy which serves both to mobilize resources for research and— partly
at least— to determine the ends to which that research is directed. Personal-
ised medicine is a development of the larger promissory economy of medical
biotechnology. As such, it systematically conflates public benefit with the
pursuit of commercial and especially pharmaceutical interests. Consequently,
research and development in personalised medicine tends to favour the pro-
duction of expensive new treatments over unprofitable forms of prevention or
more effective use of older therapies. A rebalancing of research priorities is
needed to favour the pursuit of public benefit, even when it does not deliver
private profits. This will in turn require sustained reflection, self-criticism
and often self-denial on the part of public research funders and the scientists
they support.
keywords personalised medicine, promissory economy, biotechnology,
medical innovation, drug discovery, genomics
Science is driven by promises. Without the promise of edifying knowledge, useful
new technologies, and other social goods, scientists would not devote their careers
to research, nor society provide the very substantial resources that modern science
consumes. Yet the outcomes of scientific research are by their nature uncertain
and unpredictable. Consequently, much of what science promises inevitably goes
unfulfilled, while what scientists actually deliver is frequently different from what
was promised.
This is not necessarily a problem. Society is often willing to overlook scientists’
failure to deliver on particular promises, so long as science is seen as yielding
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social benefit overall. At times, however, the mismatch between promise and delivery
comes to be seen as problematic, be it by scientists or their funders or the wider
public. At such times, it is tempting to suppose that the problem lies in the dissemi-
nation of unrealistic or irresponsible promises — of ‘hype’, in other words — and
that the best response is to try and restrict the circulation of scientific promises to
include only those with a realistic hope of fulfilment. Such an approach is likely
to be self-defeating, however. Any attempt to distinguish those promises which are
likely to be realised from those which are likely to fail will founder on the uncertain-
ties inherent in scientific research and development, and runs the risk of foreclosing
on unforeseen advances. Ultimately, hype can only be definitively distinguished from
promise with the privilege of hindsight — by which time it will be too late to be
useful.
That does not mean that scientific promise is beyond meaningful scrutiny. Rather,
it means that we need to adopt a different way of thinking about it. Instead of trying
to predict the future, it may be more helpful to focus on the present. And instead of
asking whether promises are likely to come true, it may be more helpful to ask what
function they serve. Promises are part and parcel of the social relations of science.
Not least, they are a vital element in the economy of science. As such, they need
to be seen in relation to the flow of resources and goods that sustains and to an
extent determines the nature of scientific work. What kind of promises circulate
at any given time, what degree of credibility they enjoy, what resources they help
to mobilize, and what consequences follow from their fulfilment or non-fulfilment,
all depend upon the structure and dynamics of the particular scientific field in which
they arise. Promises are shaped by the aims and interests of the various individuals,
groups and institutions who make up that field, including the scientific knowledge
and other goods that they seek to deliver, as well as the resources and rewards
they hope to garner. In short, scientific promises are best understood in the
context of particular promissory economies (e.g. Brown et al. 2000; Martin
2015). Once we adopt this point of view, we can begin to ask other questions
about scientific promises besides whether they are likely to come true or not. We
can ask why particular kinds of scientific promises are being articulated and circu-
lated, why resources are being devoted to fulfilling particular problems and not
others, and what this means for the direction in which science is developing.
This approach can help to throw light on current anxieties that the promise of per-
sonalised medicine has become tainted by hype. Precisely what counts as personal-
ised medicine is a matter of debate. But most current definitions focus on the
development and implementation of tests for biomarkers which either indicate elev-
ated risk of developing certain conditions or which identify individuals most likely to
benefit from particular therapeutic and especially pharmaceutical interventions.
Research in personalised medicine thus tends to focus on identifying biomarkers,
including but by no means confined to genomic markers; elucidating how those bio-
markers relate to health status, drug response etc.; and developing interventions
aimed at preventing or treating the illnesses with which those markers are associated
(Tutton 2014). This definition of personalised medicine serves to locate it in a quite
specific social and historical context. Personalised medicine can be seen as an
expression of the medical biotechnology sector as it developed from the 1970s
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onwards. Consequently, if we want to understand current concerns about the
promise and hype of personalised medicine, we might usefully examine the evolution
of the promissory economy of medical biotechnology.
The emergence of the biotechnology sector from the mid-1970s coincided with
and helped to catalyse a major reconfiguration of the economy of scientific
promise. Before the 1960s, public support for science was rarely accompanied by
demands for evidence of specific social benefits. On the contrary, it was widely
accepted that leaving ‘basic’ science to proceed unhindered by the need to engage
directly with societal needs was the best way to ensure that it would ultimately
lead to useful if often unforeseen applications. By the 1970s, however, a combination
of factors, from left-wing critiques of the way that science was linked to military pur-
poses, to right-wing concern at burgeoning government science budgets, led to new
demands for more tangible evidence that science did indeed deliver public benefit.
For many, particularly in the USA, the delivery of public goods was increasingly
understood in terms of the commercial development of new commodities and ser-
vices, including new medicines and diagnostic services; while national prosperity
became identified with the pursuit of innovation-based industrial competitiveness
(Gibbons et al. 1994; Jasanoff 2005, pp. 225–246; Berman 2015). In effect, the
value of science as a public good came at this time to be regarded in large part in
terms of its ability to drive commercial activity.
In this context, the demonstration in 1974 that living cells could be genetically
engineered to produce proteins encoded by DNA from other species was widely
hailed, not just as a major achievement in basic science, but as the beginnings of a
revolutionary new production technology with the potential to transform pharma-
ceutical production, in particular. Private investors began to fund new biotechnology
ventures, including both new start-up companies and commercially oriented aca-
demic research programmes, particularly in the USA, where measures to encourage
venture capital and other forms of speculative investment were being enacted
around the same time. By the early 1980s the biotechnology sector was gaining
ground as a distinctively novel form of scientific life, characterized by an unprece-
dented degree of inter-penetration of academic and commercial institutional
forms, and by a profound blurring of older distinctions between basic science and
market-oriented research and development (de Chadarevian 2011; Rasmussen
2014; Yi 2015; Owen and Hopkins 2016).
Commercial promise was vital to the growth of biotechnology. Given the delays
and uncertainties between early-stage scientific research and the eventual delivery
of new products to market, the ability to secure private investment depended
heavily on generating persuasive indicators of a future return on that investment.
Patents had particular promissory value in this regard (Doganova and Muniesa
2015), and steps were taken in a number of countries to make it easier for research-
ers and universities as well as companies to obtain patents on their work— the USA
again leading the way with the passage of the 1980 Bayh–Dole Act among other
measures (Berman 2008). Other markers of commercial promise also came to pro-
minence around this time, including ‘cloning by press conference’ — the announce-
ment of scientific results to the press before they appeared in peer-reviewed journals,
as much in order to impress investors as to claim scientific priority (Rasmussen
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2014, pp. 89–91) — as well as public disclosure of research plans and details of
patent applications (Fortun 2008). The biotechnology sector thus enacted a promis-
sory economy in which the funding of research was to a significant extent predicated
on the promise, not just of useful new products and services, but of future profits.
The 1980s and 1990s saw rapid expansion not just in the technical capabilities of
molecular biology, but in the nature and scope of the biotechnological promises if
offered. The first biotechnology companies focused primarily on developing recom-
binant DNA techniques to manufacture therapeutic molecules such as insulin and
interferon. By the mid-1980s, however, researchers had also begun adapting molecu-
lar biological methods to the work of mapping and ultimately cloning genes associ-
ated with a range of human diseases. Such work initially concentrated on rare
single-gene disorders such as Huntington’s disease, Duchenne muscular dystrophy
and cystic fibrosis. But researchers were optimistic that they would soon be able
to identify and clone genes associated with much commoner conditions including
cancer and heart disease. This fuelled a further wave of expansion in the promissory
economy of biotechnology. As early as the mid-1980s, market analysts were project-
ing a huge growth in the market for commercial genetic diagnostics, particularly for
common disorders (Nelkin and Tancredi 1989, pp. 33–35), and by the early 1990s,
hopes were rising for the inception of radically new forms of gene therapy (Martin
1999; Stockdale 1999; Lindee and Mueller 2011).
What most attracted investors, however, was the expectation that research into
the molecular genetics of common disorders offered a means of identifying novel
molecular targets for new classes of drugs. By the mid-1990s, a second wave of bio-
technology startups was emerging which sought to commercialize the means of
genomic discovery itself. Companies such as Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Human
Genome Sciences, Millennium Pharmaceuticals and later Celera Genomics suc-
ceeded in securing not just venture capital, but also lucrative deals with big pharma-
ceutical companies (Hopkins et al. 2007; Gottinger and Umali 2008). Closely linked
in many cases to key centres of academic genome research, these initiatives also
benefited from the increasing amounts of public and charitable funding devoted
to genomic research, from the Human Genome Project to the International Haplo-
type Mapping Project (International HapMap Consortium 2003) as well as a pro-
liferation of national biobanks. The field of genomics was thus characterized by a
remarkable convergence of commercially and publicly funded research.
That funding was in turn underwritten by a promissory rhetoric that further
blurred the distinction between public and commercial benefits. Mirroring the rheto-
ric of first-wave biotechnology, this included talk of the private profits to be made
from new diagnostic and therapeutic technologies, as well as the national economic
benefits that would come from building thriving biotechnology, pharmaceutical and
diagnostics industries. But genomic researchers and their funders also promised
other benefits. Appreciation of individual genomic differences would make it poss-
ible to assess personal health risks and devise personalised preventive interventions,
they argued. It would also ensure that therapeutic measures targeted not just the
patient’s illness, but also the way they responded to different drugs. By ensuring
that patients were prescribed the most suitable drugs for their individual consti-
tution, the new science of pharmacogenetics would also minimize wasteful
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prescribing of ineffective medicines and reduce the costs of adverse drug reactions
(Hedgecoe and Martin 2003; Smart and Martin 2006). It would thus deliver econ-
omic savings as well as public health benefits. It was this peculiar combination of
preventive and therapeutic promises, with its distinctive alignment of personal
health benefits, gains in the economic efficiency of healthcare, and the delivery of
profitable new pharmaceutical products, that increasingly came to be publicized
under the banner of ‘personalized medicine’ (Tutton 2014).
As of early 2017, fulfilment of these ambitious promises remains patchy at best, as
other contributors to this special issue have noted. This is partly because the role of
genes in disease aetiology has turned out to be much more complicated than orig-
inally envisaged. In only a few cases has it been possible to identify genetic variants
that indicate actionable levels of personal risk of common diseases, while even
single-gene disorders often involve large numbers of different mutations with
widely-varying effects. Consequently, as Kezia Gaitskell observes above, genetic
screening has generally proved less effective as a preventive measure than originally
envisaged (Gaitskell, this volume).
Rather more success has been achieved in using genomics to illuminate disease
pathways, identify druggable targets, and develop new drugs, particularly in
cancer and in various auto-immune and inflammatory conditions. Consequently,
many of the drugs that have reached the market over the past twenty years owe
their discovery in whole or in part to genomic research— though even here, progress
has been sporadic (Maughan, this volume). Genomic technologies, including phar-
macogenetic stratification of patients, have also been incorporated into the clinical
stages of new drug development, with the aim of improving response rates and
excluding non-responders from clinical trials. Since many of these new drugs
target particular genetic sub-groups of patients, developments in this area might
reasonably be regarded as having delivered a degree of ‘personalization’ of medicine.
Ironically, however, delivery of such drugs has done little to fulfil the promise that
personalised medicine would lead to cost savings. On the contrary, since the
patient populations for such drugs are often relatively small, drug companies have
generally marketed them at correspondingly high prices, in order to generate the
levels of financial return that they expect from new medicines.
Meanwhile, the promise that pharmacogenetic targeting of treatments would
deliver greater safety and efficiency in the use of older medications such as warfarin
has also gone largely unfulfilled. The reasons for this are complex, including lack of
compelling evidence that such targeting is actually beneficial in practice, and reluc-
tance on the part of doctors and healthcare funders to implement new practices in
the absence of such evidence (Hedgecoe 2004). However, the unwillingness of
pharmaceutical manufacturers to do anything to reduce the size of the patient popu-
lations to whom their products are prescribed has also been a significant limiting
factor (Danzon and Towse 2002; Hogarth et al. 2006).
Seen in economic perspective, personalised medicine has thus been much better at
fulfilling its promise to reward private investment, whether in the pharmaceutical or
biotechnology sector, than at delivering savings to health services and their funders.
This is disappointing. However, once we see the promise of personalised medicine,
not just as a prediction of future possibilities, but as part of the promissory economy
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of biotechnology, it is unsurprising. As we have seen, that economy has grown up
around an increasingly close alignment of research, including publicly funded
research, with the pursuit of commercial interests; while the fulfilment of biotechno-
logical promise, including the promise of public benefit, is widely assumed to lie in
the successful commercialization of that research. Given this privileging of private
interests as the means to secure public goods, it is unsurprising that technologies
such as pharmacogenetics have chiefly been adopted in ways that are consistent
with the pursuit of drug company profits, while applications that might secure econ-
omies in healthcare but undermine profitability have largely been ignored.
Meanwhile, substantial public as well as private funds continue to be devoted to
supporting research into the genomics of human diseases, and to promoting the
commercialization of that research. In the UK, for instance, Genomics England’s
100,000 Genome Project combines public and private funding in a bid to elucidate
the genetics of cancer and rare diseases, while a similar function is served in the USA
by the Cancer Moonshot programme. Such programmes continue to be
accompanied by the language of personalization. They are also distinguished by
engagement with clinical healthcare, both as a source of patient information and
for the opportunities it offers for clinical research. As such, these programmes
reflect the desire of funders and researchers to expedite the translation of genomic
research findings into medical services and products. The same intentions inform
the growth of public and private funding for so-called ‘translational medicine’ —
a rather heterogeneous field of research and development activities in which person-
alised medicine occupies a prominent position; across such initiatives, the idea of
translation is commonly conflated with successful commercialization of research
(Mittra and Milne 2013). Finally, orphan drug legislation has done much to boost
the profitability of biotechnology-based pharmaceuticals aimed at small patient
populations (Mikami in preparation). Assisted by such measures, the dominant
direction of personalised medicine continues to be towards the production of
expensive new treatments for ever-smaller populations of patients.
It is unclear howmuch longer that trajectory can be sustained. New treatments are
constantly straining the limits of what health technology assessment agencies con-
sider cost-effective, while the cumulative cost of such medicines poses a major chal-
lenge to even the best-resourced health systems. For now, the problem is being
addressed on a case-by-case basis, as decisions are made about whether or not par-
ticular medicines are affordable — though there is a danger that this will provoke
public dissatisfaction with systematic efforts to deliver affordable healthcare.
Meanwhile, research which might instead help to reduce healthcare spend — for
instance by stratifying patient populations to ensure that medicines are only deliv-
ered to those who are likely to benefit, or by identifying new uses for older and
no-longer-profitable forms of treatment — goes relatively neglected. There is thus
a need to rebalance research priorities so as to place greater emphasis on the
kinds of innovation that would favour public health concerns over commercial inter-
ests. This will not be easy. For one thing, commercial actors in the personalised medi-
cine arena are unlikely to support such a move. But more generally, as we have seen,
the promissory economy of personalised medicine has evolved in such a way that
public benefit is overwhelmingly identified with commercial success. Consequently,
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any attempt to reorient personalised medicine research in a way that better serves the
public interest will require careful unpicking of that promissory economy, in order to
distinguish those areas of work that can be effectively pursued through commercial
partnerships, from those that require a conscious uncoupling of publicly funded
medical innovation from the pervasive expectation of commercial profit. This will
involve more than just demarcating hype from legitimate promise. It will require sus-
tained reflection, self-criticism and often self-denial on the part of public research
funders and the scientists they support.
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